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Attack graphs provide compact representations of the attack paths that an attacker can follow to compro-
mise network resources by analysing network vulnerabilities and topology. These representations are a
powerful tool for security risk assessment. Bayesian inference on attack graphs enables the estimation of
the risk of compromise to the system’s components given their vulnerabilities and interconnections, and ac-
counts for multi-step attacks spreading through the system.Whilst static analysis considers the risk posture
at rest, dynamic analysis also accounts for evidence of compromise, e.g. from SIEM software or forensic in-
vestigation. However, in this context, exact Bayesian inference techniques do not scale well. In this paper we
show how Loopy Belief Propagation - an approximate inference technique - can be applied to attack graphs,
and that it scales linearly in the number of nodes for both static and dynamic analysis, making such analy-
ses viable for larger networks. We experiment with different topologies and network clustering on synthetic
Bayesian attack graphs with thousands of nodes to show that the algorithm’s accuracy is acceptable and
converge to a stable solution. We compare sequential and parallel versions of Loopy Belief Propagation with
exact inference techniques for both static and dynamic analysis, showing the advantages of approximate
inference techniques to scale to larger attack graphs.
General Terms: Security risk assessment, attack graphs, dynamic analysis
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Bayesian networks, probabilistic graphical models, approximate infer-
ence
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite significant efforts to protect networks against cyber-attacks [Gartner, Inc.
2014], system administrators cannot cope with the sophistication of modern threats,
as shown by the history of breaches that organizations have suffered in recent years
[Lord 2015]. One of the most common strategies to protect networks is to identify and
patch vulnerabilities. However, this is often not systematically done, either for lack of
manpower or because it requires interrupting critical systems. A risk-driven approach
is therefore needed to optimise resources for network protection. Such an approach
requires assessing the networks risks, prioritizing the most critical threats, and then
estimating the risk exposures, given the likelihood of threats and the severity of the
impacts [Wheeler 2011]. Finally, these values are used by administrators to select ap-
propriate countermeasures. But often this analysis is carried out separately for each of
the network components ignoring interdependencies between vulnerabilities, i.e. how
successfully exploiting a vulnerability allows an attacker to exploit other vulnerabili-
ties, thus moving across the network and acquiring privileges at every step.
These shortcomings can be addressed using Attack Graphs (AGs) [Sheyner et al.
2002; Albanese et al. 2012], a well-established technique to represent the possible
paths of an attacker through the system by exploiting successive vulnerabilities. AGs
allow system administrators to reason about threats and risks in a formal way to better
select countermeasures [Ingols et al. 2009]. Two types of analysis can be undertaken.
Static analysis determines the a priori risks to which network components are ex-
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posed.Dynamic analysis updates those risks in light of any indication that some of the
network components may have been compromised, e.g. from Security Information and
Event Management (SIEM) and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Dynamic analysis
also allows administrators to profile the attacker’s paths, to determine the nodes that
are more likely to be attacked in the next steps. This enables administrators to evalu-
ate the security risk for valuable resources in the network and reason about the nodes
that may have been already compromised when we observe evidence of an ongoing at-
tack. As organizations are often under attack, dynamic analysis gives administrators
important insights on the most vulnerable targets and where they should spend their
efforts at run-time. Although several metrics have been proposed to perform security
risk assessment using AGs [Idika and Bhargava 2012; Noel and Jajodia 2014], tak-
ing into consideration the length and the number of paths that let the attacker reach a
goal, or the global impact of the existing vulnerabilities in the network, they fail to con-
sider the difficulty of exploiting each vulnerability and the dependencies between the
different attack paths. In this sense, it is easy to observe that both static and dynamic
analysis of AGs have inherent probabilistic characteristics given the uncertainty about
the attackers’ ability to successfully exploit vulnerabilities. Therefore, considering the
dependencies between vulnerabilities, Bayesian Networks (BNs) provide an appropri-
ate framework to model AGs, since they depict causal relationships between random
variables in a compact way, so that they can model the uncertainty about the attacker’s
behaviour and capabilities.
Bayesian Attack Graphs (BAGs) can be analysed through efficient algorithms, such
as Variable Elimination or Junction Tree (JT), to make exact inference, i.e. to compute
the unconditional probabilities of all the nodes in the BAG, i.e. the probabilities that
an attacker can reach the different security states in the AG [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al.
2015]. However, computing these probabilities in BNs is known to be an NP-Hard
problem [Cooper 1990], and this limits the applicability of exact inference techniques
to medium-size graphs (in the order of 100-1,000 nodes), especially when the structure
of the graph is dense [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2015]. However, empirical investigations
show that networks are highly complex: estimates of mean corporate network size are
in the order of thousand of nodes [Sharma et al. 2011; Raftopoulos and Dimitropoulos
2013]. Moreover, each host may have somewhere between 2 and 11 vulnerabilities
according to [WhiteHat Security 2015]. For example, Websites are reported to have an
average of 6.5 vulnerabilities [Symantec 2015]. This impacts the size of the AGs, as
the number of vulnerabilities also determines the number of potential attack paths.
In this context exact inference techniques would be very slow and computationally
very expensive, which limits their applicability for practical purposes, especially for
the dynamic analysis of BAGs. For this reason, simpler metrics, computationally less
demanding, have been proposed for tractable analysis of AGs in real networks [Idika
and Bhargava 2012; Noel and Jajodia 2014]. However, these metrics do not consider
the dependencies between vulnerabilities.
To sidestep this limitation we propose to use approximate inference techniques to
allow us to analyse AGs in larger networks in a tractable way. Although making ap-
proximate inference in BNs is also NP-Hard [Koller and Friedman 2009], approximate
inference algorithms, such as Loopy Belief Propagation (LBP) [Pearl 1988], have better
scalability than exact inference techniques. We should not be deterred by the “approx-
imation” involved in this context for two reasons. First, because the probabilities are
used for prioritising threats, so even if significant differences between them are mean-
ingful, their absolute or accurate values are relatively less important. Second, because
the probability of successful exploitation of a vulnerability is already a rough estimate,
often based on Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [Common Vulnerability
Scoring System, V3 2015], which ignores other factors such as attacker’s skills, knowl-
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edge and tooling and, hence, they may not be an accurate indication of compromise
per se. Therefore, notwithstanding their inherent approximation, the better scalability
of these algorithms makes them highly crucial to perform qualitative risk analysis of
large networks. Although the validity of the results is limited by the errors in the esti-
mates of the probabilities, in our experimental evaluation we show that the accuracy
of the probability estimates provided by LBP is reasonable for static and dynamic risk
analysis and mitigation using BAGs.
The main contributions of this work are as follows:
—To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose the use of approximate
inference techniques for the scalable analysis of AGs. Furthermore, we propose and
compare both the sequential and parallel implementations of LBP to estimate the
probabilities of compromise for the network nodes.
—We provide a comprehensive experimental evaluation using synthetic AGs which em-
ulate the complexity of real scenarios. These experiments allow us to assess the ap-
plicability of sequential and parallel implementations of LBP for the analysis of AGs
with thousands of nodes, and show the limitations of existing exact inference ap-
proaches, such as the JT algorithm [Shenoy and Shafer 1990].
—We show through experiments that LBP scales linearly in the number of nodes for
both static and dynamic analysis of BAGs, which contrasts with the exponential scal-
ability of exact inference (e.g. JT) in some cases, especially when the AG is dense. The
experiments further show that the accuracy of LBP is sufficient for many practical
needs exhibiting a rooted mean squared error smaller than 0.03.
—Finally, we show that it is possible to get accurate results before the LBP algorithm
fully converges, by allowing administrators to monitor the probability estimates at
each iteration, and enabling them to start planing risk mitigation strategies in ad-
vance. This is not possible with exact inference techniques.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the related
work, and in Section 3 we describe the two typical representations of AGs. In Section 4
we introduce the Bayesian AGmodel, including an example of a small typical corporate
network as a use case. The use of Belief Propagation and LBP for the analysis of BAGs
is described in Section 5. We discuss the Junction Tree algorithm proposed in [Mun˜oz-
Gonza´lez et al. 2015] in Section 6. In Section 7 we present the experimental results for
the static and dynamic analysis of synthetic AGs. Finally, in Section 8 we present the
main conclusions and our plans for further work.
2. RELATED WORK
AG representations are built by analysing the interdependencies between the vulner-
abilities and the security conditions identified in a network. Two representations are
commonly encountered in the literature: State-based representations [Jha et al. 2002;
Phillips and Swiler 1998; Sheyner et al. 2002; Sheyner and Wing 2004; Swiler et al.
2001] depict the whole state of the network in each node in the graph whilst logical
AGs [Ammann et al. 2002; Jajodia et al. 2005; Ou et al. 2006] are bipartite graphs rep-
resenting the dependencies between vulnerabilities and security conditions. Although
state-based AGs contain all the possible attack paths that can allow an attacker to
reach a target security condition, they scale exponentially with the number of vulner-
abilities and nodes in the network, which limits their application to very small net-
works. Relying on the monotonicity principle, logical AGs eliminate duplicate paths
and provide a more compact representation that scales polynomially with the number
of vulnerabilities [Ammann et al. 2002; Jajodia et al. 2005].
AGs are a powerful tool to perform risk assessment and different metrics have been
proposed in the literature. [Lippmann et al. 2006] propose to use the percentage of net-
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work assets an attacker has compromised. However, this metric is not goal-oriented,
as it is the case of AGs. [Pamula et al. 2006] propose the weakest adversary metric,
i.e. measure the risk according to the weakest attack path in the graph. Simpler ap-
proaches are used in [Phillips and Swiler 1998; Ortalo et al. 1999; Li and Vaughn
2006], where they propose to use the shortest path, the number of paths, and the av-
erage path length as metrics to measure risk. In a similar way, [Idika and Bhargava
2012] propose the normalized mean, standard deviation, mode, and median of the path
lengths as a set of metrics to assess risk in AGs. In [Noel and Jajodia 2014] propose
a metrics suite for AG that takes into account the CVSS scores of the vulnerabilities
in the AGs as well as topological aspects of the graph, such as the connectivity, the
number of cycles, and the depth. However, most of these metrics fail to account for the
dependencies of the vulnerabilities and attack paths, as well as the difficulty to ex-
ploit the vulnerabilities. These limitations can be addressed with probabilistic models,
which allow to compute the probabilities of each node in the graph to be compromised
by an attacker when the network is at rest or under attack.
Probabilistic models for AGs have been already proposed in the literature: For exam-
ple, [Frigault et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2008] present mechanisms to calculate the con-
ditional probability tables, which represent the probabilities of compromising a node
given all possible states of the parent nodes (or preconditions). However, no mecha-
nism is proposed to calculate the unconditional probabilities, i.e. the probabilities of
compromising the nodes in the network regardless of the state of their correspond-
ing preconditions. A more complete Bayesian model is described in [Xie et al. 2010],
which takes into account non-perfect behaviour of the alert correlation system and the
impact of zero-day vulnerabilities. However, no inference technique is proposed to cal-
culate the unconditional probabilities and the experimental evaluation does not show
the applicability of their model to networks of different sizes.
Several techniques have also been proposed in the literature for exact inference on
BAGs. For example, forward-backward propagation is proposed in [Poolsappasit et al.
2012] to compute the unconditional probabilities. However, this procedure is only valid
for chains [Rabiner and Juang 1986; Murphy 2012] and cannot be applied to general
AGs. [Liu and Man 2005] propose to use Variable Elimination (VE) [Dechter 1996] for
exact inference on BAGs. Although this is an efficient technique, it is highly dependent
on the heuristic for the elimination ordering and no heuristic is suggested in [Liu and
Man 2005]. Furthermore, none of these papers reports an experimental evaluation of
the time and memory required by the techniques proposed to assess their suitability
for static and dynamic analysis of AGs. More recently, the JT algorithm was proposed
in [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2015] for exact inference in BAGs. This technique allows
us to efficiently compute the exact unconditional probabilities by using a probabilistic
message passing scheme on a clique tree representation of the original graph [Shenoy
and Shafer 1990; Shafer and Shenoy 1990]. The experimental evaluation in [Mun˜oz-
Gonza´lez et al. 2015] shows the advantages of JT over VE in terms of the time and
the memory required. However, the applicability of JT to large networks is limited,
especially when the AGs are dense, i.e. there are a lot of attack paths.
[Baiardi et al. 2014], [Baiardi and Sgandurra 2013] present a Monte Carlo-based
method to generate AGs by simulating intelligent attackers’ plans. By collecting sam-
ples in these simulations, the proposed tool returns a dataset used to compute statistics
of interest for the assessment, such as the success probability of the agents or their av-
erage impact. [Sommestad et al. 2009] present a Bayesian framework to express AGs
that enables the computation of the probability that attacks will succeed, and the cor-
responding expected loss given the instantiated architectural scenario. [Cuppens et al.
2002] propose a framework to correlate attacks with intrusion goals, and introduce the
notion of anti-correlation, which is useful to decide whether a sequence of correlated
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actions can lead to an intrusion. Hence, it can also be used to eliminate false positives.
[Tan et al. 2003] introduces two algorithms to cluster hosts based on their observed
connection patterns considering that they can change over time. The experimental re-
sults obtained for real networks show that the number of clusters can be two orders of
magnitude smaller than the number of hosts. Therefore, we can use these clusters to
produce smaller AGs that can accurately summarise the state of the network.
3. ATTACK GRAPHS
AGs are graphical models that represent the knowledge about network vulnerabilities
and their interactions, showing the different paths an attacker can follow to reach a
given goal by exploiting a set of vulnerabilities. Along each attack path, vulnerabilities
are exploited in sequence, so that each successful exploit gives the attacker more priv-
ileges towards his goal. In the literature of AGs we can distinguish two main types of
representations, namely state-based and logical AGs.
Definition 3.1. A state-based AG is a tuple AG = {S, τ, S0, St}, where S is a set of
states, τ ⊆ S × S is a transition relation, S0 ⊆ S is a set of initial states, and St ⊆ S is
a set of target states [Sheyner et al. 2002].
State-based representations of AGs [Jha et al. 2002; Phillips and Swiler 1998;
Sheyner et al. 2002; Sheyner and Wing 2004; Swiler et al. 2001] result in directed
graphs, where each node represents the state of the whole network after a successful
atomic attack. This approach has two main shortcomings: First, the number of states
and variables combinatorially explodes when increasing the number of nodes in the
network. Second, these representations contain duplicate attack paths that differ only
in the order of the attack steps, which increases the complexity of the graph. This lim-
its the applicability of state-based representations to very small networks [Ammann
et al. 2002; Jajodia et al. 2005; Ou et al. 2006].
The scalability problems of state-based representations are overcome with logical
AGs, which are bipartite graphs which represent dependencies between exploits and
security conditions [Ammann et al. 2002; Jajodia et al. 2005]. More formally:
Definition 3.2. A logical AG is a directed bipartite graphG = (E∪C,Rr∪Ri), where
the vertices E and C are the sets of exploits and security conditions, respectively, and
the edges Rr ⊆ C × E and Ri ⊆ E × C are require and imply relations [Albanese et al.
2012].
These representations rely on a monotonicity principle: that the attacker never re-
linquishes privileges once obtained. Although not always applicable, this assumption
is reasonable in most cases, as discussed in [Ammann et al. 2002]. Monotonicity al-
lows to remove duplicated paths and to generate AGs that grow polynomially with the
number of vulnerabilities and the number of connected pairs of hosts [Albanese et al.
2012].
4. BAYESIAN ATTACK GRAPHS
Some of the literature on AG analysis assumes that monotonicity induces a Directed
Acyclic Graph (DAG) structure of logical AGs [Liu and Man 2005; Poolsappasit et al.
2012; Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2015]. Although monotonicity helps to get rid of many
cycles related to duplicate attack paths (that appear in state-based representations)
some cycles still remain. However, [Wang et al. 2008] explain how to handle and elimi-
nate cycles without loss of integrity. In this paper, we consider AGs with a DAG struc-
ture. Where cycles appear, we refer to [Wang et al. 2008] to build the corresponding
conditional probability tables in the nodes affected by the cycle. The DAG structure
of logical AGs, the uncertainty about the attacker’s behaviour and capabilities, make
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BNs a suitable alternative to model AGs and perform static and dynamic analysis. In
particular, BNs allow us to calculate the probability of an attacker to reach a security
condition (state) in the AG.
Definition 4.1. A BN is a directed acyclic graphical model where the nodes repre-
sent random variables and the directed edges represent the dependencies between
random variables. Let X = {X1, ..., Xn} be a set of (continuous or discrete) random
variables. The joint probability distribution can be written as:
p(X) =
n∏
i=1
p(Xi|pai) (1)
Then, under the BN representation, for each nodeXi there is a directed edge from each
node in pai, the set of parents nodes of Xi, pointing to Xi.
In the context of the BAG, the nodes represent the different security states that
an attacker can reach. We model the behaviour of these states as Bernoulli random
variables. Hence, the probability of an attacker to compromise a node Xi is Pr(Xi =
T ) = p, whereas the probability of an attacker not to compromise that node is Pr(Xi =
F ) = 1 − p, with p ∈ [0, 1]1. The probabilities of an attacker successfully exploiting
a vulnerability, needed to compute the conditional probabilities p(Xi|pai) in (1), are
represented as parameters of the model, since these values varies slowly across time
(in the order of days or weeks).
4.1. Model Assumptions
In line with much of the related work [Liu and Man 2005; Frigault et al. 2008; Pool-
sappasit et al. 2012; Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2015], we make some assumptions on our
model:
—We consider that the probability of successfully exploiting a single vulnerability does
not affect the probabilities that the attacker can successfully exploit other vulner-
abilities. We also assume that these probabilities remain nearly constant in time.
Although in [Frigault et al. 2008] the dynamic aspects of vulnerabilities are mod-
elled with a dynamic BN, in practice changes to the probabilities typically occur over
periods of days or weeks. Therefore, we argue that it is better to recompute the model
when changes occur rather than to increase the complexity of the model to include
the dynamic aspects of these probabilities.
—We assume that the probability of successfully exploiting a vulnerability is the same
regardless of the attacker. However, these probabilities can be updated according
to other models that take into account the attackers’ capabilities and preferences
[Baiardi and Sgandurra 2013]. For example, we can use different sets of AG param-
eters corresponding to different attacker models identified as proposed in [Baiardi
and Sgandurra 2013]. We can then select, according to the attacker model, the corre-
sponding parameters to perform the dynamic analysis of the AG.
—We also assume that the topology of the network, host connectivity (including open
ports) and the set of vulnerabilities do not change during the dynamic analysis of the
BAG. This would require dynamic AG generation, which is out of the scope of this
paper. However, if existing vulnerabilities are patched at run-time, our BAG repre-
sentation can be easily updated by setting the probability of successful exploitation
of the patched vulnerabilities to zero. On the contrary, if new vulnerabilities are dis-
covered or new nodes are added to the network, a new AG needs to be generated.
1To simplify the mathematical notation we will refer to the unconditional probability of a node to be com-
promised as Pr(Xi) instead of Pr(Xi = T )
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—We do not consider zero-day vulnerabilities, social engineering attacks, and insider
threats. Although it is easy to incorporate these kinds of threats in the AG by adding
one extra attack path to each security condition in the graph, as proposed in [Pool-
sappasit et al. 2012; Xie et al. 2010], the difficulty lies in estimating a reasonable
probability of successful exploitation of those zero-day vulnerabilities and social en-
gineering attacks. In fact, no mechanism for the estimation of these probabilities is
proposed in the literature, except from letting the network administrator quantify
their effects (in a subjective way) [Poolsappasit et al. 2012; Xie et al. 2010], which is
however a challenging task. A more detailed description of the difficulties to estimate
the impact of zero-day vulnerabilities in AGs can be found in [Albanese et al. 2013].
4.2. Conditional Probability Tables
The information available at each node Xi in a BAG is the conditional probability
distribution p(Xi|pai), the probability of a node to be compromised given the state of
its parent nodes pai. Thus, these conditional probabilities represent the probabilities
of an attacker to reach a security state Xi given the observations of its preconditions
pai and the vulnerabilities vi that can be exploited to compromiseXi. In this sense, we
consider that the probabilities of successfully exploiting vulnerabilities are parameters
of the BAG model that are used to calculate p(Xi|pai).
A common approach to estimate pvi , the probability of an attacker successfully ex-
ploiting a vulnerability vi, is based upon CVSS [Common Vulnerability Scoring Sys-
tem, V3 2015]. Although CVSS scores are intended to estimate the impact of a vulner-
ability rather than its average probability of being successfully exploited, CVSS scores
(or some of their submetrics) are often used in the literature to estimate pvi [Frigault
et al. 2008; Poolsappasit et al. 2012; Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2015]. In this sense, the
exploitability submetric of CVSS can be considered more appropriate to estimate pvi ,
since it tries to measure the difficulty of exploiting a vulnerability.
Finally, given an estimate of the probabilities of exploitation of the vulnerabilities
that allow an attacker to reach a security stateXi from states pai, we consider two pos-
sible cases to build the conditional probability tables [Poolsappasit et al. 2012; Mun˜oz-
Gonza´lez et al. 2015]: AND and OR conditional probability tables. In the first case,
all the preconditions need to be satisfied to be able to compromise Xi, i.e. the attacker
needs to compromise all the nodes in pai before being able to perform an attack to com-
promise Xi. In the case of OR conditional probability tables, the attacker only needs
to compromise one of the nodes in pai to attempt an attack to reach the security state
Xi.
Considering that the alert system is not perfect (the IDS can trigger false alarms or
miss events, and that some other events maybe stealthy) and that its estimated error
rate is pe, AND conditional probability tables can be calculated as:
p(Xi|pai) =
{
pe, ∃Xj ∈ pai|Xj = F
1− (1− pe) (1−
∏
j:Xj
pvj ), otherwise
(2)
whereas for OR conditional probability tables, using the noisy-OR formulation [Koller
and Friedman 2009], we have:
p(Xi|pai) =
{
pe, ∀Xj ∈ pai|Xj = F
1− (1− pe)
∏
j:Xj
(1− pvj ), otherwise
(3)
Estimating the error probability, pe, of the alert correlation system is difficult due to
the dynamic aspects of the system behaviour. In this sense, several approaches esti-
mate this error probability based on ad hoc methodologies and test the system under
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particular conditions [Milenkoski et al. 2015]. More recently, [Juba et al. 2015] propose
a novel approach to evaluate alert correlation systems providing statistical guarantees
on the measured performances.
Combining (2) and (3) we can extend the construction of conditional probability ta-
bles to intermediate cases, where different subsets of preconditions need to be satisfied
before trying to compromise Xi. As proposed in [Xie et al. 2010], the non-perfect be-
haviour of the alert system can also be modelled by adding an extra nodeOi to describe
the observation from the alert system. Thus,Xi, which describes the actual state of the
node, would be the parent of Oi. Then, the conditional probability table p(Oi|Xi) can
be built taking into account the estimation of the false alarm and detection rates of the
alert system.
4.3. Prior on the Attacker’s Initial State
In AG representations, there is usually a leaf node representing the initial state of the
attacker when the attacker has not compromised any node in the network yet. Follow-
ing the model in [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2015], we consider that this node is not really
a random variable, since it only represents that the attacker has full rights on his own
machine. Under the Bayesian representation, we can consider that the Bernoulli ran-
dom variableX0 representing the initial state of the attacker has Pr(X0) = 1. Although
[Poolsappasit et al. 2012] propose to use this initial node to reflect some subjective
prior knowledge of the attacker capabilities (by letting the administrator set the value
of Pr(X0)), this can lead to misleading conclusions, especially when reasoning using
new evidence about the nodes that an attacker may have already compromised, as dis-
cussed in [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2015]. Finally, to obtain more accurate estimations
of the unconditional probabilities needed for the analysis of BAGs, we can break loops
in the BN by instantiating one initial node for each possible initial attack path. This
does not affect the value of the unconditional probabilities of the rest of the nodes but
can favour the convergence and the accuracy of LBP estimates [Murphy et al. 1999].
4.4. Static and Dynamic Analysis of the BAG
For the static analysis of AGs we are interested in calculating the unconditional prob-
ability distributions p(Xi), rather than p(Xi|pai). Thus, p(Xi) corresponds to the prob-
ability of an attacker to reach a given security condition and, hence, is an indicator of
the risk. Using Bayes rule, it is possible to calculate p(Xi) from the product of condi-
tional probability distributions:
p(Xi) =
∑
X−Xi
p(X) =
∑
X−Xi
n∏
j=1
p(Xj |paj) (4)
whereX−Xi indicates that we sum over all the set of random variables X except Xi.
In contrast, for the dynamic analysis of AGs, given evidence of attacks on a set
of nodes Xe, e.g. through SIEM alerts, we need to compute the posterior probability
p(Xi|Xe), i.e. the probability of an attacker to compromise the node Xi given that we
have observed evidence of attack at nodesXe. Again, using Bayes rule, we can compute
this posterior distribution from the joint probability distribution:
p(Xi|Xe) =
p(Xi,Xe)
p(Xe)
=
∑
X−{Xi,Xe}
p(X)∑
X−Xe
p(X)
(5)
However, the exact calculation of (4) and (5) is an NP-Hard problem [Koller and
Friedman 2009]. Thus, applying brute force and computing the joint probability dis-
tributions to make inference in probabilistic graphical models is not a reasonable ap-
proach in terms of computational time and memory. Thus, efficient algorithms, such
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as Variable Elimination (VE) [Dechter 1996] or Junction Tree (JT) [Shenoy and Shafer
1990; Shafer and Shenoy 1990], are necessary even for small graphs. However, the
applicability of these techniques is limited, especially when the graphs are dense, de-
manding a lot of memory to compute the unconditional probabilities. In these cases,
approximate inference is a reasonable alternative to enable a tractable estimation of
the unconditional and posterior probabilities. Although approximate inference in BNs
is also NP-Hard [Koller and Friedman 2009], efficient techniques like LBP [Pearl 1988]
allow us to efficiently estimate the unconditional and the posterior probabilities in (4)
and (5) for large networks. In Section 5 we describe how to use LBP for the analysis of
BAG.
4.5. Applying Bayesian Attack Graphs for Security Risk Assessment and Mitigation
The BAG model can be applied in practice by system administrators to perform se-
curity risk assessment and risk mitigation strategies. For both applications we also
distinguish two kind of analysis: static, i.e. considering the security posture of the net-
work at rest, and dynamic, i.e. when the network is operative and attacks may occur.
For risk assessment, the BAG model can be built from the network topology, network
reachability, and the results of a vulnerability analysis. Then, we can compute the
conditional probability tables for the nodes in the BAG by determining the values of
the successful exploitation of vulnerabilities. As shown before, this can be done using
the exploitability submetric of the CVSS score. On the resulting BAG we can use exact
or approximate inference techniques, such as the JT algorithm or LBP, to perform
static risk assessment by computing the unconditional probabilities of all the nodes.
These probabilities can be used as risk estimates to detect weak areas in the network
and serve as an input for network hardening or static risk mitigation techniques.
For dynamic risk assessment, we recompute the probabilities of the BAG model at
run-time taking into account indications that some of the networks components can
have been compromised, for example from IDS or SIEM. Thus, the state of the random
variables represented by the corresponding nodes for which we observe evidence of
compromise are set to 1 (the true state). Then, the posterior probabilities of the rest
of the nodes given the evidence of the compromised nodes are computed. This allows
system administrators to dynamically profile the possible attack paths.
On the other hand, the unconditional and posterior probabilities provided by the
BAG model can be used to mitigate the potential or existing risks in the network by
proposing security countermeasures to effectively reduce the risk of the target nodes
to be compromised. In this sense, the network hardening techniques proposed in [Noel
et al. 2003; Albanese et al. 2012; Dewri et al. 2007] aim to eliminate or reduce the risk
of compromising a target node by proposing a set of countermeasures. In [Noel et al.
2003; Albanese et al. 2012], this is achieved using monotonic logic heuristics, whereas
in [Dewri et al. 2007] the authors also consider a cost model of implementing the coun-
termeasures. However, these techniques are restricted to static risk mitigation. In con-
trast, [Poolsappasit et al. 2012] model risk mitigation as a discrete reasoning problem
solved using a genetic algorithm that can be applied for dynamic risk mitigation in
combination with the output provided by a BAG model.
4.6. Example
In this subsection we show an example of analysis of a BAG in the scenario depicted
in Fig. 1, which represents a typical small corporate network. We will also use this
example to illustrate and explain the inference algorithms described in Sections 5 and
6.
In detail, for the network in Fig. 1 we have an internal LAN for corporate employees,
and a DMZ hosting the company’s servers, namely, a public Web server, a Mail server,
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Fig. 1. Example of a Small Network with one LAN, a Mail server, a Web server, and a Database server.
and a local Database server (used to store public and private data). For each node,
we have indicated the set of reachable ports, and from which other nodes they are
reachable: this set includes those ports open/filtered by the firewall, as well as those
open/closed by local firewalls, switches, routers, etc. In addition, we have highlighted
some vulnerabilities that might be present on the network nodes. As an example, the
Web server can be accessed on port 80 and port 43 by any other node (and also from
the Internet), whereas it can be reached on port 22 (SSH server) only from the IP ad-
dresses belonging to the “Admin PC” node in the LAN2. Further, we suppose this node
has a vulnerability affecting the SSH server (CVE-2015-6564). For each vulnerability,
we show in Fig. 1 over which port it can be exploited (in case the vulnerability is a
remote one), the CVE identifier, the type of vulnerability (DoS, elevation of privilege,
etc.), and the likelihood of exploiting such a vulnerability. We have based this likelihood
on the CVSS Exploitability Subscore, which we have divided by 10. In our particular
example, when the corresponding score is 1.0 (which means, an exploit already exists
and it is ready/easy to use), we have decided to lower the value to 0.95, since a proba-
bility of successful exploitation of 1.0 means that the attacker has already reached the
next security state, without necessarily exploiting the vulnerability, which is not true.
Finally, we suppose a generic attacker exists that is willing to launch attacks from the
Internet.
The BAG representation for this example is shown in Fig. 2. Following the guidelines
described before, we have two nodes A1 and A2 that represent the initial attacker’s
state for the two possible initial attack paths, and the final objective of the attacker is
to compromise the Database server (node F ). With these settings, the joint probability
for all the nodes in the BAG can be written as:
p(A1, A2, B, C,D,E, F ) = p(A1) p(A2) p(B|A1) p(C|A2) p(D|B,C) p(E|C) p(F |D,E) (6)
In Fig. 2.(a) we show the result of the static analysis of the BAG, where we are
interested in computing the unconditional probabilities when no evidence of attack
is observed. In this case, we observe that the Database server can be compromised
with a probability of 79.9% and that this high risk is due to the high probability of
compromising the Mail server. We can use this analysis to prioritize patching of the
2If not explicitly indicated, it means that any other port is closed.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2. BAG example: (a) Unconditional probabilities for the static analysis. (b) Posterior probabilities when
there is evidence of attack at the Mail Server.
Fig. 3. Updated posterior probabilities when the vulnerability from the Mail Server to the Data Base server
has been patched in the BAG example in Fig. 2.
most critical vulnerabilities present in the network, as proposed in [Albanese et al.
2012].
An example of dynamic analysis of the BAG is shown in Fig. 2.(b), where we consider
that the alert correlation system triggers an alarm on the Mail server. For the sake
of clarity, we have considered here a perfect behaviour of the alert correlation system.
Fig. 2.(b) shows the posterior probabilities for all the network nodes given the evidence
of compromise at node D. As expected, we observe that the risk of compromising the
Database server increases to 84.8%. When reasoning about the potential attack path
allowing the attacker to compromise the Mail server, the posterior probability of both
nodes B and C is the same - in this example the paths are equally likely.
In Fig. 3 we show the updated posterior probabilities when the system administrator
has patched the vulnerability from the Mail Server to the Data Base Server, so that
the corresponding attack path has been removed in the BAG representation. To re-
compute the posterior probabilities, we just need to update the conditional probability
table for node F (the Data Base server) by considering that the probability of success-
ful exploitation of the vulnerability from the Mail Server is zero. Then, we recompute
the posterior probabilities given the evidence of attack in the Mail Server. As shown
in Fig. 3, this countermeasure reduces the risk of the Data Base server being compro-
mised from 84.8% to 24.2%. In the next section we describe how these probabilities can
be efficiently computed.
5. SCALABLE INFERENCE ON BAYESIAN ATTACK GRAPHS
In this section we introduce two efficient techniques to make inference in BAGs: Be-
lief Propagation (BP) and Loopy Belief Propagation (LBP). Both algorithms are based
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Fig. 4. Factor Graph representation for the BAG in Fig. 2 removing the attack path from the LAN admin
to the Mail server.
on message passing schemes that allow to compute the unconditional probabilities of
the nodes in BNs or Markov Random Fields (MRFs). While BP is a method for exact
inference, it is restricted to tree or polytree graph structures. On the contrary, LBP is
an approximate inference technique that can be applied to graphs with loops.
5.1. Belief Propagation
As mentioned earlier, BP allows to compute the unconditional probabilities in a BN
or a MRF when the graph is a tree or a polytree [Pearl 1982; 1988]. Although this
structure is restrictive for AGs in general, BP can be applied for inference on Attack
Trees [Schneier 1999]. Furthermore, for graphs with a general structure we can use
the JT algorithm as an extension of BP, as we describe in Section 6. To describe the
BP algorithm, we introduce the concept of factor graphs using a formulation similar to
that given in [Bishop 2006]. BNs and MRFs allow us to express the joint probability
distribution of a set of random variables as a product of factors over subsets of those
variables. Factor graphs make this factor decomposition explicit by introducing addi-
tional nodes for the factors themselves, in addition to those representing the variables,
thus resulting in bipartite graphs.
Referring to the example shown in Fig. 2, if we remove the attack path from the LAN
admin to the Mail server (for example, by patching the vulnerability), the resulting AG
is a tree and we can use BP for inference. For this reduced BAG, the joint probability
distribution can be factorised as:
p(A1, A2, B, C,D,E, F ) =
5∏
i=1
fi(Xi) (7)
where the corresponding factors fi(Xi) are:
f1(A1, B) = p(A1) p(B|A1)
f2(A2, C) = p(A2) p(C|A2)
f3(B,D) = p(D|B)
f4(C,E) = p(E|C)
f5(D,E, F ) = p(F |D,E)
(8)
Note that several factor graph representations may exist for a given BN (or MRF)
[Bishop 2006]. However, the selection of a specific representation does not significantly
impact the performance of BP. In our example, the corresponding factor graph accord-
ing to (8) is shown in Fig. 4.
BP works by passing real valued functions called messages among the neighbouring
nodes in the graph. Since factor graphs are bipartite, there are two possible types of
messages: From variable to factor, and from factor to variable. The message from a
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variable Xi to a factor fj in the neighbourhood of Xi is given by:
µXi,fj (Xi) =
∏
fk∈{Fi−fj}
µfk,Xi(Xi) (9)
where µfk,Xi(Xi) are the messages from the factor nodes in the neighbourhood of Xi
except fj. On the other hand, the message from a factor node fi to a variable node Xj
in the neighbourhood of fi is calculated as:
µfi,Xj (Xj) =
∑
Xk∈Xs
fi(Xj ,Xs)
∏
Xk∈Xs
µXk,fj (Xk) (10)
whereXs is the set of variable nodes in the neighbourhood of fi except Xj .
When a variable Xi is a leaf node, the corresponding messages to the factors in its
neighbourhood are equal to one, i.e. µXi,fj (Xi) = 1. On the contrary, if a factor fi is a
leaf node, the message to a variable node in its neighbourhood is given by µfi,Xj (Xj) =∑
Xk∈Xs
fi(Xj ,Xs).
To compute the unconditional probabilities for all the nodes in the graph, BP needs
to compute all the messages from all node variables to their corresponding factors and
vice versa. BP proceeds starting from the leaf nodes (either variable or factor nodes)
and propagates the messages across the graph such that a variable node Xi cannot
send a message to a factor fj until Xi receives all messages from its neighbouring
factors except fj. The same applies when sending messages from factors to variable
nodes. For example, in the factor graph in (4), we cannot send a message from factor
f5 to variable F until f5 receives a message from variables D and E.
Once all messages are computed, the unconditional probability for a node Xi, when
the graph is a BN3, can be calculated as:
p(Xi) =
∏
fj∈Fi
µfj ,Xi(Xi) (11)
where Fi are the factor nodes in the neighbourhood ofXi. Therefore, BP can efficiently
calculate all the marginal probabilities by computing all the messages once and storing
them.
For the dynamic analysis, when we observe new evidence of compromise in some
nodes, we only need to recompute the factors that depend on the variables that have
changed in order to obtain the posterior probability on all the nodes of the network
given the evidence of compromise. Further details are explained in [Koller and Fried-
man 2009]. Finally, the details about the computational complexity of BP will be dis-
cussed in Section 6 along with the corresponding discussion for the complexity of JT,
as BP can be considered as a particular case of JT.
5.2. Loopy Belief Propagation
LBP is a simple extension of BP [Pearl 1988] applied to graphs (BNs or MRFs) that
contain loops. The difference is that, in the presence of loops, the results of LBP are
approximate estimates of the unconditional probabilities of the nodes in the graph.
LBP uses the same factor graph representation as BP. In Fig. 5 we show the corre-
sponding factor graph representation for the BAG depicted in Fig. 2, where we observe
that there is one loop due to the attack path from the LAN admin node to the Mail
server. The corresponding factors fi(Xi) are the same as in (8) except for f3, which in
this case also depends on variable C, so that f3(B,C,D) = p(D|B,C).
3For MRFs we need to include a normalization factor.
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Fig. 5. Factor Graph representation for the BAG in Fig. 2.
ALGORITHM 1: Initialize messages for LBP
Input: Set of nodes X, set of factors F.
Output: Messages from nodes to factors, µXi,fj , and from factors to nodes, µfi,Xj .
for each node Xi in X do
for each factor fj in Fi (the neighbourhood of Xi) do
µXi,fj (Xi)← 1;
end
end
for each factor fi in F do
for each node Xj in Xs (the neighbourhood of fi) do
µfi,Xj (Xj)←
∑
Xk∈Xs
fi(Xj ,Xs);
end
end
There are two possible implementations of LBP according to how messages are com-
puted, namely Sequential LBP (S-LBP) and Parallel LBP (P-LBP) [Murphy 2012] (they
sometimes are also referred as asynchronous and synchronous LBP respectively). For
S-LBP we iteratively compute the messages in (9) and (10) following some arbitrary
schedule, until the unconditional probability estimates obtained with (11) converge or
until a maximum number of iterations has been reached. Although there is no restric-
tion on the order in which we update the messages (9) and (10), and the beliefs (11),
depending on the structure of the graph, there are some scheduling techniques that
can be applied to favour convergence and reduce the time to achieve it [Koller and
Friedman 2009]. In Algorithm 2 we have detailed the steps to compute and update the
messages in S-LBP.
In contrast, P-LBP updates all the messages for all factors and variable nodes at
the same time, using the values of the messages at the previous iteration. Thus, at
iteration t, we first update the messages from nodes to factors. The update equation
for the message from a node Xi to a factor fj can be written as:
µ
(t)
Xi,fj
(Xi) =
∏
fk∈{Fi−fj}
µ
(t−1)
fk,Xi
(Xi) (12)
In a second step we update the messages from factors to variable nodes where the
equation the message from factor fi to node Xj is given by:
µ
(t)
fi,Xj
(Xj) =
∑
Xk∈Xs
fi(Xj ,Xs)
∏
Xk∈Xs
µ
(t)
Xk,fj
(Xk) (13)
Finally, we compute the new estimates of the marginal probabilities with (11) with
the updated messages obtained using (13). As in the previous case, the algorithm is
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ALGORITHM 2: Sequential LBP
Input: Set of nodes X, set of factors F, convergence tolerance ǫ, maximum number of iterations
max iter.
Output: Unconditional probabilities p(Xi) for all the nodes in X.
iter = 0;
Initialize messages according to Algorithm 1;
repeat
iter← iter + 1;
for each node Xi in X do
p(Xi)
old ← p(Xi);
end
for each node Xi in X do
for each factor fj in Fi (the neighbourhood of Xi) do
µXi,fj (Xi) =
∏
fk∈{Fi−fj}
µfk,Xi(Xi);
end
end
for each factor fi in F do
for each node Xj in Xs (the neighbourhood of fi) do
µfi,Xj (Xj) =
∑
Xk∈Xs
fi(Xj ,Xs)
∏
Xk∈Xs
µXk,fj (Xk);
end
end
for each node Xi in X do
p(Xi) =
∏
fj∈Fi
µfj ,Xi(Xi);
end
until
(∑N
i=1
|p(Xi)− p(Xi)
old| < ǫ
)
OR (iter ≥ max iter);
repeated until the unconditional probabilities converge or a maximum number of iter-
ations is reached. The details of P-LBP are shown in Algorithm 3.
For the first iteration in both S-LBP and P-LBP we initialize the messages from
nodes to factors to 1. The messages from a factor fi to a node Xj are initialized as
µfi,Xj (Xj) =
∑
Xk∈Xs
fi(Xj ,Xs). This procedure is described in Algorithm 1.
According to [Koller and Friedman 2009], S-LBP usually works better than P-LBP,
although they require scheduling messages in a guided way. However, the experimen-
tal results on synthetic BAGs, presented in Section 7, show a similar behaviour for
both implementations in terms of accuracy.
In Fig. 6 we show the corresponding estimates for the unconditional probabilities in
the BAG depicted in Fig. 2.(a) when there is no evidence of attack. It can be observed
that there is no difference (at least in the 3 first decimals) between the true and the
estimated probabilities for nodes A-E and that, for node F , the marginal probability
estimated with LBP4 is 0.805 while the true probability is 0.799. When evidence of at-
tack is observed at the Mail server (nodeD), shown in Fig. 2.(b), the LBP unconditional
probability estimates match the exact probabilities. The reason for this exact result is
that, given the evidence of attack, D can be considered as a deterministic node. This
splits the graph into two tree structures with the remaining unobserved nodes: {A1, B}
and {A2, C,E, F} and the message passing scheme produces exact results for the two
trees.
One of the drawbacks of LBP is that, in general, convergence is not guaranteed.
[Weiss 2000] show that LBP converges for graphs with a single loop and derives an
analytical relationship between LBP probability estimates and the true unconditional
4In this case both S-LBP and P-LBP provide the same result.
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ALGORITHM 3: Parallel LBP
Input: Set of nodes X, set of factors F, convergence tolerance ǫ, maximum number of iterations
max iter.
Output: Unconditional probabilities p(Xi) for all the nodes in X.
iter = 0;
Initialize messages according to Algorithm 1;
repeat
iter← iter + 1;
for each node Xi in X do
p(Xi)
old ← p(Xi);
for each factor fj in Fi (the neighbourhood of Xi) do
µoldXi,fj (Xi)← µXi,fj (Xi);
end
end
for each factor fi in F do
for each node Xj in Xs (the neighbourhood of fi) do
µoldfi,Xj (Xj)← µfi,Xj (Xj);
end
end
for each node Xi in X do
for each factor fj in Fi do
µXi,fj (Xi) =
∏
fk∈{Fi−fj}
µoldfk,Xi(Xi);
end
end
for each factor fi in F do
for each node Xj in Xs do
µfi,Xj (Xj) =
∑
Xk∈Xs
fi(Xj ,Xs)
∏
Xk∈Xs
µoldXk,fj (Xk);
end
end
for each node Xi in X do
p(Xi) =
∏
fj∈Fi
µfj ,Xi(Xi);
end
until
(∑N
i=1
|p(Xi)− p(Xi)
old| < ǫ
)
OR (iter ≥ max iter);
Fig. 6. Estimation of the unconditional probabilities provided by LBP for the BAG in Fig. 2.(a)
probabilities. For more general graphs, [Mooij and Kappen 2005; Ihler et al. 2005]
present sufficient conditions on the convergence of LBP based on the concept of α-
contractions. However, applying the corresponding analysis is, in general, a difficult
task [Koller and Friedman 2009]. It is also important to note that convergence does not
mean correctness, i.e. LBP convergence does not imply that the unconditional proba-
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bility estimates are accurate. However, the empirical study proposed in [Murphy et al.
1999] shows that usually, when LBP converges, the approximate marginal probabili-
ties are close to the exact values.
One simple way to favour convergence is to use damping. Hence, the update of the
messages from a variable node Xi to a factor fj have the form:
µˆ
(t)
Xi,fj
(Xi) = αµ
(t)
Xi,fj
(Xi) + (1− α)µ
(t−1)
fk,Xi
(Xi) (14)
so that the damped message µˆ
(t)
Xi,fj
(Xi) is a convex combination of the message update
at iteration t and the message at iteration t − 1, where the damping factor α is a
positive value smaller than 1. The damped update for the messages from factors to
variable nodes is analogous. This technique can be applied for both S-LBP and P-LBP.
In the experiments, in Section 7, we analyse the effect of damping for the convergence
and accuracy of LBP.
It is also possible to make LBP converge to a local minimum using double loop algo-
rithms [Yuille 2001; Welling and Teh 2001]. Unfortunately, these techniques are slow
and complicated and their accuracy is often worse than the standard LBP [Murphy
2012], since they are prone to converge to poor local minima. Similarly, other tech-
niques, such as the mean field approximation, have been proved to converge but are
usually less accurate than LBP, since the non-convexity of the mean field objective
function leads to poor solutions [Weiss 2001].
6. JUNCTION TREE
The existing literature on BAGs has focused on the use of exact inference techniques
for the static and dynamic analysis of AGs. [Liu and Man 2005] propose to use Variable
Elimination as a mechanism to compute the unconditional probabilities in the graph.
[Poolsappasit et al. 2012] propose to use forward-backward propagation, however this
technique can only be applied when the graph is a chain [Rabiner and Juang 1986;
Murphy 2012], which is not the case for most AGs. Finally, [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al.
2015] propose to use the JT algorithm to efficiently compute the unconditional proba-
bilities enabling the static and dynamic analysis of AGs with hundreds of nodes. The
experimental evaluation in [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2015] shows the advantages of the
JT compared to the Variable Elimination algorithm proposed in [Liu and Man 2005] in
terms of computational complexity and memory required. Thus, in this section we de-
scribe the JT algorithm, as the state-of-the-art technique to perform exact inference for
the static and dynamic analysis of BAGs and serves as benchmark for the comparison
with LBP.
The JT or clique tree algorithm is an extension of BP, for exact inference, that can be
applied on BNs or MRFs with a general structure. In this case, BP’s message scheme is
applied to a tree structure where the nodes represent clusters of the random variables
in the graph. There are two main variants for the JT: The Shenoy-Shafer algorithm
[Shenoy and Shafer 1990; Shafer and Shenoy 1990] and the Hugin algorithm [Lau-
ritzen and Spiegelhalter 1988]. Although both techniques rely on the same principles,
they differ in the way the messages are computed. In the following, we will describe
the Shenoy-Shafer method which uses the same message passing scheme as BP.
The first step of JT is to create a cluster graph with a tree structure from the initial
BN (or MRF). This cluster graph (or clique tree) can be considered an extension of
factor graphs with clusters of several random variables between two factors. In this
case, one random variable can appear in more than one cluster node. However, the
cluster graph needs to satisfy the running intersection property: if a random variable
Xi appears in two cluster nodes, Xi ∈ Cj and Xi ∈ Ck, then Xi also appears in each
cluster node in the unique path existing between Cj and Ck in the clique tree.
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Fig. 7. Factor Graph representation for clique tree obtained from the BAG in Fig. 2.
In the case of BNs, to create a clique tree we first need to moralize the graph, i.e.
make the graph undirected and add a link between the nodes that have a common child
(this step is not needed for MRFs). The moral graph is then triangulated to obtained
a chordal graph, i.e. one in which every minimal loop in the graph is of length three.
Finally, each maximal clique in the chordal graph is a cluster node in the clique tree.
As shown in [Koller and Friedman 2009], we can create the cluster graph with the VE
algorithm [Dechter 1996].
For the BAG example in Fig. 2, we show in Fig. 7 a factor graph representation of
the corresponding clique tree obtained using VE. For this factor graph representation,
the assignment of the different terms in (6) to the factors in Fig. 7 is:
f1(A1, B) = p(A1) p(B|A1)
f2(A2, C) = p(A2) p(C|A2)
f3(B,C,D) = p(D|B)
f4(C,D,E) = p(E|C)
f5(D,E, F ) = p(F |D,E)
(15)
With the factor graph representation of the clique tree we can calculate the uncon-
ditional probabilities using the same message passing scheme as in BP. The difference
is that, in this case, the scopes of the messages given in equations (9) and (10) depend
on multiple random variables rather than just one, as in the case of BP.
Once all the messages are computed, the unconditional joint probability for the vari-
ables in a cluster nodeXs (provided that the graph is a BN) is calculated as:
p(Xs) =
∏
fj∈Fs
µfj ,Xs(Xs) (16)
whereFs are the factor nodes in the neighbourhood of the cluster nodeXs. To calculate
the marginal probability for one random variableXi in the clusterXs, we just sum over
the rest of the variables in Xs:
p(Xi) =
∑
Xj∈{Xs−Xi}
p(Xs) (17)
Evidence of compromise can be easily included when using JT, in the same way as
in BP. Further details can be found in [Koller and Friedman 2009]. The computational
complexity of JT is exponential in the scope of the biggest factor in the clique tree.
Concretely, if all the variables in the graph are discrete and have K possible values
each (in our case, K = 2), JT scales in time and space as O(|F |Ks), where |F | is the
number of factors and s is the size of the scope of the largest factor in the clique tree
(3 in the example in Fig. 7). Moreover, the computational complexity of applying VE
algorithm to build the clique tree is also exponential. This can limit the application
of JT for large graphs, although it depends on the structure of the graph, as we will
show in the experiments. The scalability for BP and LBP is similar to that of JT, i.e.
they scale in time and space as O(|F |Ks). However, since BP and LBP do not cluster
variables, the factors are usually smaller, so we expect to have smaller s.
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7. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we present an experimental evaluation comparing the accuracy and
performance of sequential and parallel implementations of LBP with that of the JT
algorithm used in [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2015]. In detail, we first analyse the accuracy
of LBP when computing the unconditional and posterior probabilities for the static
and dynamic analysis of AGs, and then compare the time required to estimate these
probabilities with that required by JT. This allows us to determine if LBP is a suitable
alternative for tractable analysis of large AGs, and if the risk estimates are sufficiently
accurate to help administrators propose risk mitigation strategies.
For JT we have used VE to build the clique tree, selecting the elimination order-
ing according to the min-weight heuristic [Koller and Friedman 2009]. As shown in
[Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2015], the elimination ordering has an impact on the perfor-
mance of the algorithm, reducing the memory required and the time to compute the
unconditional probabilities. For S-LBP and P-LBP we have used a tolerance threshold
of 10−3 for the convergence of the algorithm, i.e. we assume that the algorithm has
converged if the biggest change in the unconditional probabilities is less than 10−3. We
have used the Bayes Net toolbox for Matlab5 for all the algorithms.
To provide a comprehensive evaluation with different graph sizes, different possible
network topologies, and interdependencies, we have generated synthetic AGs in the
experiments. Note that, currently, there are no collections of AGs of similar variety
obtained empirically from real systems; in fact, no collections of empirically obtained
AGs exist in the public domain at all. Furthermore, from the examples reported in the
literature it is hard to determine the typical graph structures of AGs, e.g. for large
corporate networks. We expect these graph structures to vary significantly since they
depend on the network topology and the distribution and type of vulnerabilities across
the network components. For these reasons, we have used the structures proposed in
[Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2015] to generate the synthetic AGs: pseudo-random graphs,
where we control the in-degree of the nodes, which is related to the number of vulnera-
bilities that a node in the network can have; and cluster graphs, which model scenarios
with different subnetworks that are weakly connected. Then, for each subnetwork, we
generate the AG with a pseudo-random structure.
The values for the probabilities of successful exploitation of vulnerabilities are
drawn at random from the distribution of CVSS scores extracted from [cvs 2015]. We
normalize the scores dividing them by 10. In Fig. 8 we show the distribution of CVSS
scores. The value of these probabilities can have an impact in the accuracy of the un-
conditional probability estimates, and in the convergence of the algorithms. Although
we think that the exploitability submetric of CVSS scores is a better indicator of the
difficulty of exploiting a vulnerability, it is difficult to get the distribution of this sub-
score, and so we have used the distribution of the whole CVSS score instead. Finally,
since we do not have data to estimate the error probability of the alert systems, and
their accuracy changes in time and with the topology of the network, we have consid-
ered in our experiments that the alert system does not trigger false alarms. Although
we recognise that the false alarm rate is usually very high, we consider that these
will be processed and diagnosed before being considered as evidence of compromise. In
this sense, we can consider different approaches to reduce and simplify the analysis
of IDS alerts: On one side, we can use filtering techniques to reduce the number of
alerts to be inspected by discarding those likely to be false positives [Cotroneo et al.
2015; Spathoulas and Katsikas 2010]. On the other hand, we can use correlation sys-
tems to identify and cluster alerts pertaining to the same event [Raftopoulos and Dim-
5https://github.com/bayesnet/bnt
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Fig. 8. Distribution of the CVSS scores [cvs 2015].
Table I. Average RMSE plus/minus one standard deviation for PLBP on pseudo-random
BAGs with m = 3 and 40 nodes varying the damping factor α and the probability of having
AND-type conditional probability tables, p(AND).
p(AND) α = 0.0 α = 0.1 α = 0.3 α = 0.5
0.0 0.0315± 0.0223 0.0272± 0.0187 0.0291± 0.0194 0.0266± 0.0175
0.2 0.0218± 0.0141 0.0222± 0.0143 0.0266± 0.0206 0.0276± 0.0183
0.5 0.0182± 0.0103 0.0150± 0.0067 0.0165± 0.0123 0.0175± 0.0083
0.8 0.0081± 0.0069 0.0108± 0.0097 0.0131± 0.0100 0.0112± 0.0064
1.0 0.0081± 0.0058 0.0069± 0.0047 0.0107± 0.0096 0.0089± 0.0085
itropoulos 2011; Pecchia et al. 2011]. We can also reduce the number of false positives
with SIEM by combining multiple sources of information (e.g., IDS) to flag potential
breaches and by ensuring that the event has been discovered by other monitoring com-
ponents in the networks [Valeur et al. 2004].
For the experimental evaluation we start analysing the accuracy, convergence, and
scalability of S-LBP and P-LBP for the pseudo-random AGs. Then, following a similar
treatment we present the experimental results on cluster AGs.
7.1. BAGs with pseudo-random structure
To build this kind of BAGs we generate random DAGs where we limit the maximum
number of parents that a node can have. This corresponds to restricting the maximum
number of vulnerabilities that can lead an attacker to reach a certain security condi-
tion. Since in real scenarios we expect to have a reduced number of vulnerabilities that
allows an attacker to compromise a network node [WhiteHat Security 2015; Symantec
2015], we consider that this structure is reasonable. Thus, for each node in the graph
Xi, we randomly select its number of parents by drawing a random integer np in the
interval [1,m] uniformly, wherem is the maximum number of possible parents allowed.
Then, we randomly select the np parent nodes for Xi from the set of nodes in the BAG
for which Xi is not a parent node already. This avoids directed cycles and preserves
the DAG structure. In Fig. 9 we show an example of a random BAG with 20 nodes and
m = 4.
7.1.1. Accuracy and Convergence. In our first experiment we want to measure the accu-
racy and the convergence of both S-LBP and P-LBP for pseudo-random AGs. We have
therefore generated synthetic AGs with 40 nodes and m = 3, where we have varied
the proportion of OR and AND conditional probability tables. We have also explored
different values for the damping factor α in the range [0, 0.5]. We have measured the
accuracy using the Rooted Mean Squared Error (RMSE), comparing LBP estimates
with the exact unconditional probabilities provided by JT. For each combination of pa-
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Fig. 9. Example of random BAG with 20 nodes andm = 4.
rameters explored we have averaged the RMSE obtained for 20 independent BAGs.
From the results in Tab. I we observe that the RMSE is less than 0.03 in most cases,
which is a reasonable accuracy to estimate the risks of compromising the different
nodes in the AG, especially when considering that the probabilities of successful ex-
ploitation of vulnerabilities are not accurate, since they are estimated with the CVSS
scores. Thus, the accuracy of LBP is enough to allow system administrators to decide
the actions that need to be taken (both for the static and the dynamic analysis of the
network). It is also interesting to observe that a little bit of damping, i.e. small values
of α, slightly improve the accuracy. Furthermore, it is remarkable that the RMSE is
lower when the proportion of AND-type conditional probability tables is higher. This
effect is due to the different coupling effect between the variables in the loops of the
BAG depending on the type of conditional probability table. In Tab. I we only show the
RMSE for P-LBP, since the differences w.r.t. S-LBP were negligible. Moreover, we have
also observed that both implementations of LBP converged in all cases.
7.1.2. Accuracy with the Number of Iterations. In our second experiment we have analysed
how the accuracy of the LBP probability estimates changes with the number of itera-
tions. LBP allows us to monitor the intermediate estimates of the unconditional prob-
abilities, which is not possible with JT. This can help system administrators to reduce
the time to respond to an attack, since they do not need to wait until the algorithm has
completely converged.
In Fig. 10 we show the average RMSE of P-LBP and S-LBP as a function of the
number of iterations for 25 pseudo-random BAGs with 100 nodes and m = 3. The
probability of having AND-type conditional probability tables has been set to 0.5, and
we have used a damping factor of α = 0.2 in both LBP implementations. From the
results in Fig. 10 we can observe that the algorithms converge on average in less than
15 iterations, although P-LBP seems to converge faster, and gets better estimates of the
unconditional probabilities after the first iteration (although the final result is similar
to S-LBP). From Fig. 10 it is important to note that, after 5 iterations, the RMSE for
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Fig. 10. Average RMSE of P-LBP and S-LBP with the number of iterations for 25 pseudo-random BAGs
with 100 nodes andm = 3.
P-LBP is about 0.05. This accuracy can be considered reasonable to start planning risk
mitigation strategies at run-time without waiting for LBP to converge.
7.1.3. Time Scalability. Our last experiment with pseudo-random BAGs is aimed at
evaluating the time scalability of LBP and JT for the static and dynamic analysis
of AGs. We have analysed networks with different sizes and different densities: For m
we have explored the values 3 and 4, while for n, the number of nodes in the BAG, we
have used values in the range [20, 3000]. However, for JT we have limited the value of
n to 120 for m = 3 and to 80 for m = 4 because of physical memory limitations6. The
probability of having AND-type conditional probability tables is set to 0.5. For each
value of n and m we have generated 20 pseudo-random BAGs and, for each BAG, we
compute the unconditional probabilities for all the nodes with both LBP and JT.
In Fig. 11 we show the average time required to compute the unconditional proba-
bilities for all the nodes in the BAG for P-LBP, S-LBP, and JT. In the case of JT, the
measured time includes the time required to build the clique tree, and compute all
the messages and all the unconditional probabilities. For LBP, this time considers the
computation of all the messages and the probability estimates. Therefore, we are, in
essence, measuring the time required to perform the static analysis of the BAG. For
both LBP variants we use α = 0.2 and set the maximum number of iterations to two
times the number of nodes in the network. As in the previous experiment, both LBP
implementations converged in all cases.
From the results shown in Fig. 11 we can observe the exponential increase of JT with
the number of nodes, whereas both P-LBP and S-LBP scale linearly. Although the time
to compute the unconditional probabilities by JT is lower for small AGs (less than 100
nodes), it appears that LBP is a suitable alternative to make inference in large BAGs,
where the exponential scalability of JT makes its use impractical. It is also interesting
to note that P-LBP is faster than S-LBP. Moreover, when increasing the complexity of
the network (by increasing m) the performance of P-LBP remains similar, whereas we
can observe larger differences for S-LBP.
For the dynamic analysis of AGs, when we observe evidence of compromise in some
nodes, we need to recompute all the messages taking into account the evidence as
well as the posterior probabilities in all the graph nodes. This applies equally well to
JT and LBP. However, for JT, we do not need to build the clique tree again. So, to
analyse the performance of the algorithms for the dynamic analysis of AGs, we have
randomly selected 3 nodes in each graph where we consider that evidence of attack has
6The experiments have been conducted in a 16 GB computer with an Intel Core i7 processor at 3.40 GHz.
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Fig. 11. Average time to compute the unconditional probabilities for P-LBP, S-LBP, and JT for pseudo-
random attack graphs. The notation P-LBP-m, S-LBP-m, and JT-m stands for the value ofm, the maximum
number of parents allowed for each node, used to generate the graphs in each case.
been observed. Then, we have measured the time required to recompute the posterior
probabilities for P-LBP, S-LBP, and JT. We have omitted the resulting figure, since the
results are very similar to those obtained for the static analysis (shown in Fig. 11). The
measured times for the dynamic analysis are slightly lower for all the methods and the
differences are not very significant. In the case of the JT, this means that for this kind
of graphs the bottleneck of the algorithm is the computation of the messages rather
than the time required to build the clique tree [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2015]. This is
due to the strong interconnection of the nodes in the graph, which makes some clusters
in the clique tree to have a high number of variables. For LBP implementations, the
similarity of the results suggests that the number of iterations needed to converge are
similar.
For the sake of clarity, we have omitted in Fig. 11 the results obtained with LBP for
networks from 500 to 3000 nodes. However, we have observed that the linear scalability
of LBP holds. Thus, for BAGs with 3000 nodes the average time to perform the static
(or dynamic) analysis or the graph is about 60 seconds on a standard laptop. The linear
scalability of LBP for this kind of graphs make it useful for both static and dynamic
analysis of AGs, especially when the graphs are large. It is thus possible to analyse AGs
with thousands of nodes, which can correspond to networks with tens or hundreds of
thousands of nodes (depending on the number of vulnerabilities).
7.2. BAGs with cluster structure
For the experimental evaluation we have also studied the effect of clustering on the
analysis by using synthetic graphs with a cluster structure. Typical corporate net-
works are structured into subnetworks [Tan et al. 2003] and contain several hosts
with common software installations so we can expect some form of cluster structure in
the corresponding AG. To generate this kind of graphs we have considered networks
with clusters of the same size nc. Then, for each cluster, following the same proce-
dure as before, we have generated pseudo-random subgraphs, limiting the maximum
number of parents for each node to m. Finally, to include the dependencies between
clusters, we have added one edge from one node in each cluster to one node in each
of the other clusters, provided that the DAG structure required for BNs is preserved.
For our experiments we have generated synthetic clustered graphs with nc = 20 and
50, varying the total number of network nodes from 100 to 1000. In Fig. 12 we show an
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Fig. 12. Example of clustered BAG with 3 subnetworks and 10 nodes per subnetwork.
example of a clustered BAG with 3 subnetworks, with 10 nodes per subnetwork, and
m = 3.
For this kind of BAGs we have performed the same experiments as for pseudo-
random BAGs. Thus, we first assess the accuracy and convergence of the two LBP
implementation; second, we show how the accuracy evolves with the number of itera-
tions and, finally, we show the time scalability for the static and dynamic analysis of
the graphs.
7.2.1. Accuracy and Convergence. For this experiment we have generated synthetic
cluster AGs with 5 clusters with nc = 20 nodes per cluster andm = 3. As for the pseudo-
random BAGs, we have varied the proportion of OR and AND conditional probability
tables and we have explored values for the damping factor α in the range [0, 0.5]. For
each combination of parameters explored we have averaged the RMSE obtained for 20
independent BAGs. The results are shown in Tab. II, where we observe that the aver-
age RMSE is less than 0.04 in all cases, which means that the probability estimates
provided by LBP are reasonable to perform risk assessment with BAGs. We can also
appreciate that the proportion of AND/OR conditional probability tables has some im-
pact on the accuracy of the probability estimates. Thus, having a bigger proportion of
AND-type conditional probability tables results in more accurate estimations for the
unconditional probabilities in the BAG. In this case, in contrast to the results shown in
Tab. I, damping does not provide any clear improvement in the accuracy. However, even
in these cases, it is a good practice to include a little bit of damping in LBP updates
to avoid potential instabilities in the algorithm. As in the case of the pseudo-random
BAGs, we only show the RMSE for P-LBP, since the results obtained from S-LBP are
very similar. Finally, we have also observed that both, P-LBP and S-LBP, converged in
all cases.
7.2.2. Accuracy with the Number of Iterations. In Fig. 13 we show how the average RMSE
of P-LBP and S-LBP decreases with the number of iterations. For these experiments
we have generated 25 cluster BAGs with 5 clusters and nc = 20 nodes per cluster,
with m = 3. As in the case of the pseudo-random BAGs, we have set the probability
ArXiv preprint, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0, Publication date: June 2016.
Efficient Attack Graph Analysis through Approximate Inference 0:25
Table II. Average RMSE plus/minus one standard deviation for PLBP on clustered BAGs with
m = 3, 5 subnetworks and nc = 20 nodes per subnetwork, varying the damping factor α
and the probability of having AND-type conditional probability tables, p(AND).
p(AND) α = 0.0 α = 0.1 α = 0.3 α = 0.5
0.0 0.0342 ± 0.0213 0.0376 ± 0.0213 0.0341 ± 0.0157 0.0337 ± 0.0186
0.2 0.0216 ± 0.0078 0.0247 ± 0.0105 0.0289 ± 0.0154 0.0229 ± 0.0123
0.5 0.0185 ± 0.0062 0.0219 ± 0.0128 0.0193 ± 0.0083 0.0224 ± 0.0091
0.8 0.0149 ± 0.0042 0.0136 ± 0.0035 0.0138 ± 0.0078 0.0127 ± 0.0053
1.0 0.0109 ± 0.0042 0.0115 ± 0.0039 0.0093 ± 0.0043 0.0107 ± 0.0038
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Fig. 13. Average RMSE of P-LBP and S-LBP with the number of iterations for 25 cluster BAGs with 100
nodes (5 subnetworks with 20 nodes per subnetwork) andm = 3.
of having AND-type conditional probability tables to 0.5 and we have used a damping
factor of α = 0.2.
The results in Fig. 13 are very similar to those shown in Fig. 10 for the case of the
pseudo-random BAGs. Thus, we can observe that after 4 iterations, P-LBP produce
estimates for the unconditional probabilities with an average RMSE less than 0.05.
We also appreciate that, as in the previous case, P-LBP converges faster than S-LBP,
although both techniques achieve a similar approximation error after convergence.
The result of this experiment shows that, after a few iterations, the accuracy provided
by LBP can be considered reasonable to start planning risk mitigation strategies at
run-time before LBP converges.
7.2.3. Time Scalability. We report in Fig. 14.(a) the time required to perform the static
analysis for P-LBP, S-LBP, and JT. As in the case of the pseudo-random networks we
observe that JT scales exponentially with the number of nodes, although it is able to
perform static analysis on larger networks (compared to the pseudo-random AGs). In
contrast, both LBP implementations scale linearly with the number of nodes in the
BAG, and require less time than JT to compute all the unconditional probabilities for
graphs with more than 500 nodes. Also in line with the previous experiment, P-LBP
shows a better performance than S-LBP, although the difference is not as significant as
before. We can also appreciate that, for both LBP methods, the increment on the size of
the clusters implies only a small difference in the time performance of the algorithms.
In Fig. 14.(b) we show the time required to perform the dynamic analysis when we
observe evidence of attack in 3 nodes chosen at random. We can observe again that
the scalability for both LBP implementations is linear in the number of nodes, and
that the time required to compute all the unconditional probabilities in the BAG is
slightly lower than in the case of the static analysis in Fig. 14.(a). However, in this
case the performance of JT is also linear in the number of nodes and the time required
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Fig. 14. Time to compute the unconditional probabilities for P-LBP, S-LBP, and the JT algorithm for cluster
networks with different cluster sizes (nc = 20 and 50) and m = 3 for: (a) the static analysis and (b) the
dynamic analysis (when we observe evidence of attack at 3 random nodes).
to compute the unconditional probabilities is much lower than in the case of two LBP
methods.
These results indicate that, when JT is applied on clustered networks, the bottleneck
is the generation of the clique tree, while the computation of the messages is simple.
This suggests that the cluster structure of the BAGs produces clique trees with a re-
duced number of variables in each cluster of the tree. Hence, the messages sent across
nodes involve a reduced number of random variables, allowing a fast calculation of
the posterior probabilities for the dynamic analysis of the BAGs. In the case of LBP,
the messages are simpler than in the case of JT. However, the time to compute the
unconditional probabilities in the dynamic analysis is higher since, at each iteration,
we need to compute all the messages and several iterations are needed to make the
algorithm converge. Although JT is faster than LBP for the dynamic analysis of clus-
tered BAGs, the exponential scalability for the static analysis, when the clique tree is
generated, limits the tractability of the analysis for large networks. On the other hand,
as mentioned before, LBP allows us to monitor the values of the posterior probabilities
at each iteration, so that we can obtain accurate estimates for the probabilities before
the algorithm converges.
ArXiv preprint, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0, Publication date: June 2016.
Efficient Attack Graph Analysis through Approximate Inference 0:27
8. CONCLUSIONS
Bayesian Networks are a powerful tool for the static and dynamic analysis of AGs: the
unconditional probabilities at each node in the graph (not only for the target) provide
useful information to system administrators for security risk assessment and mitiga-
tion. The values of these probabilities take into account the dependencies between the
different attack paths and the difficulty of exploiting each vulnerability, in contrast to
other measures proposed in the literature to perform risk assessment in AGs. However,
the scalability problems of the exact inference techniques proposed in the literature for
the static and dynamic analysis of BAGs limit the applicability of these techniques to
graphs with a few hundreds of nodes, far from the size of the AGs we can expect in
large corporate networks.
In this paper we have shown that LBP, an approximate inference technique, can
be used effectively for the static and dynamic analysis of large BAGs. We have ver-
ified through experiments that the reduction in the computational cost and memory
requirements is significant. Moreover our experimental evaluation shows that LBP
scales linearly with the number of nodes for both the static and the dynamic analysis.
Overall these results show significantly better performance than the techniques pro-
posed for the analysis of BAGs in the literature so far. We have experimented with
synthetic AGs with a broad variety of topologies in an effort to ensure the applicability
of the technique to many network deployments. The gains in scalability are obtained
at the price of a loss in accuracy on the probabilities. We have however verified through
experiments that this accuracy loss is very low with an average RMSE of less than 0.03,
especially taking into account that the values for the probability of successful exploita-
tion of the vulnerabilities, used to build the BAG models, are non-accurate estimates.
We have also shown through the experiments that LBP compares favourably with the
JT, the state of the art technique for exact inference in BAGs [Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al.
2015]. Although a significant amount of literature on the application of AG exists,
few studies have considered the computational aspect of making inference on them.
Furthermore, the lack of scalability has significantly hindered their application. Our
results show that by using the right techniques, both static an dynamic analysis can
be performed on AGs with thousands of nodes, even on a standard laptop computer.
We have also evaluated the effect of clustering on the performance of the analysis and
shown that this can lead to further significant gains in performance. Our future re-
search plans include modelling the attacker’s capabilities to estimate the probability
of successful exploitation of vulnerabilities, and the use of Bayesian inference tech-
niques to help prioritizing forensic investigation using AGs.
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